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Introduction
The adoption of agricultural biotechnology has grown rapidly in recent years, partly due
to advantages reaped by producers.  These benefits include potential crop yield increases, pest
control cost savings, and/or ease of management.  Despite the benefits to producers that have
been attributed to biotechnology, concerns have been raised as to whether biotech and seed
companies might have captured the majority of the benefits and whether fairness to farmers has
been maintained.  Concerns over the distributional effect of biotech adoption carry policy
significance at the national level.
The purposes of this study are two-fold: (1) to estimate the size of total benefits arising
from the adoption of agricultural biotechnology, and (2) to measure the distribution of total
benefits among key stakeholders along the marketing chain, including U.S. farmers, gene
developers, germplasm suppliers, U.S. consumers, and the producers and consumers in the rest
of the world (ROW).  This study focuses on the benefits that resulted from the adoption of
herbicide-tolerant soybeans as well as Bt and herbicide-tolerant cotton in 1997, the last year for
which complete data from the USDA’s Agricultural Resource Management Study (ARMS)
survey are available.  In this study, various data sources are examined for measuring the farm-
level effects of adopting biotechnology and the resulting benefit estimates are compared.  In
addition, we use recent estimates of supply and demand elasticities that are consistent with the
current policy and market environment.  Finally, this study makes use of information from
distribution surveys at the regional level, which more realistically reflects actual commodity
flows from specific production regions to export markets.3
Previous Related Studies
A few studies have addressed the distribution of benefits from adopting Bt cotton and
herbicide-tolerant soybeans [e.g., Falck-Zepeda, Traxler, and Nelsona (FZa); FZb; Frisvold,
Tronstad, and Mortensen (FTM); Moschini, Lapan, and Sobolevsky (MLS)].  These analyses
consider the economic benefits accruing to U.S. farmers, U.S. consumers, the technology
innovators, seed companies, and the consumers and producers in the ROW.  Most of these
studies rely on a specific data source for measuring biotechnology’s impacts on crop yields and
pest control costs without paying attention to alternate data sources that might yield more
plausible results.  In addition, it is known that the total benefit and its distribution hinge on the
supply and demand elasticity assumptions in the domestic and world markets.  Yet previous
studies rely on a wide range of elasticity estimates, which are out-of-date and inconsistent with
the current policy and market environment.  Furthermore, these studies do not making use of
survey data on the distribution of biotech crops at the regional level.  The following two sections
review key past studies that have estimated the distribution of benefits from Bt cotton and
herbicide-tolerant soybeans.
Studies of Bt Cotton
FZa estimated the distribution of benefits arising from the adoption of Bt cotton in the
U.S. in 1997.  The authors adopted a theoretical framework developed by Moschini and Lapan
(ML) for assessing the welfare impacts of an innovation where the innovator behaves as a
monopolist under the protection of intellectual property rights (IPR).  The change in social
welfare was measured in both the input and output markets, and encompassed the change in
Marshallian surplus and the monopoly profit captured by the innovator.  The introduction of the4
technology was modeled in a large open economy with technological spillovers.  The authors
assumed perfect technology transfer; that is, producers in the ROW obtain the same yield gains
and reductions in insect control costs as U.S. farmers.  Regional data were employed to account
for differences in adoption rates, yield increases, and reductions in insecticide costs due to the
technology.  Farm-level impacts in the Southeast and Delta were taken from EMD data (Plexis
Marketing Group, Inc, and Timber Mill Research, Inc.), which compared like plots, thus partially
isolating the impacts of the technology.  Data for other regions were obtained from Monsanto
and Delta & Pine Land.  The gain or reduction in the stakeholders’ welfare depends critically on
the regional adoption rates, technology fees and seed premiums, farm-level effects, and
elasticities of supply and demand (table 1).  FZa results are provided in table 2.
The results of FZa’s study are subject to qualifications based on a number of important
assumptions in their model.  First, while the use of the EMD data eliminated some of the
extraneous effects on yields and pest control cost savings on fields in the Delta and Southeast,
the authors did not isolate the farm-level impacts in other regions.  Reported yields and pest
control cost savings that are larger than their actual values may exaggerate the benefits received
by U.S. and ROW producers.  Second, the supply and demand elasticities assumed in their
studies are outdated and do not properly reflect producers’ responses price changes under current
farm policy and market conditions.  For example, the supply elasticity assumed in their analysis
(0.86) is nearly double the 0.466 national supply elasticity estimated by Lin et al.  Third, FZa
assumed that each region in the U.S. exports the same share of cotton that is produced.  In fact,
the shares of cotton that are consumed domestically and exported to the ROW vary considerably
across regions.  Fourth, it was assumed that the proportion of U.S. cotton production exported to5
Table 1.  Comparison of Supply and Demand Elasticity Assumptions
This study Falck-Zepeda et al. Frisvold et al.
Stakeholder 1997 Bt Cotton
1997 HT Cotton
1997 Bt Cotton
U.S. Supply Elasticity 0.466 0.84 0.0
U.S. Demand Elasticity -0.494 -0.101 -0.3
Net Export Demand -2.34 -1.62 -2.0
ROW Supply Elasticity 0.15 0.15 n.a.
ROW Demand Elasticity -0.13 -0.13 n.a.
This study Falck-Zepeda et al. Moschini et al.
1997 HT Soybeans
U.S. Supply Elasticity 0.269 0.22 and 0.92 0.8
U.S. Demand Elasticity -0.5 -0.42 -0.4
Net Export Demand -1.21 -0.614 n.a.
ROW Supply Elasticity 0.3 0.3 0.6
ROW Demand Elasticity -0.07 -0.07 -0.4
S.A. Supply Elasticity n.a. n.a. 0.1
S.A. Demand Elasticity n.a. n.a. -0.4
n.a.= not applicable.
Table 2--Results from previous analyses on the distribution of benefits
1997 Bt Cotton 1997 Herbicide-Tolerant Soybeans
Stakeholder Falck-Zededa et al. Frisvold et al.* Falck-Zepeda et al.
$ Moschini et al.
&
mil. $ % mil. $ % mil. $ % mil. $ %
U.S. Farmer Surplus 80.0 42 7.2 5 808.3 76 156 19
U.S. Consumer Surplus 14.0 7 45.2 29 44.5 4 82 10
Monsanto 67.1 35 73.4 47 78.0 7 358.0 45
Delta and Pine Land 17.7 9 n.a. n.a. n.a.
Seed Companies n.a. n.a. 31.9 3 n.a.
ROW Producer Surplus -12.1 308 30.6 -31.0
ROW Consumer Surplus 23.4 339.4 68.4 239.0
Net ROW 11.3 6 31.4 20 99 9 208.0 26
Total World Surplus 190.1 157.2 1061.7 804.0
n.a. = not applicable.
* Results are for moderate impacts on crop yields and insect control costs.  U.S. farmer benefits exclude government
payments.  The surplus gain for Monsanto includes the benefits for the seed companies.
$ Reported results are based on a U.S. supply elasticity of 0.22.
& The surplus gain for Monsanto includes the benefits for the seed companies.  The welfare gain for the ROW
includes the gain accrued to South America.6
the ROW is the same as the proportion of imports in ROW cotton production.  The assumption
that the ROW is a mirror image of the U.S. is inaccurate.
FTM developed a mathematical model based on regional data to estimate the distribution
of benefits from adopting Bt cotton.  The model separates adopter and non-adopter benefits and
allows for government price support payments.  Rather than assuming a particular shift in the
supply curve, the authors specified the cotton supply as a step function to allow the regional
impacts to shape the curve.
 1  Adoption, yield, and cost of production data were taken from many
of the same sources used by FZb, which do not isolate the farm-level impacts.  The model’s
results were obtained by first solving a baseline model with either low, moderate, and high
changes in yields and insect control costs and then comparing the findings with those of a
constrained model where no Bt cotton was assumed to be planted.  The results obtained with
moderate impacts are given in table 2.  FTM’s findings differ considerably from those of FZa,
particularly with respect to the benefits received by U.S. farmers and U.S. consumers.  For
example, FTM found that U.S. farmers obtained only 5 percent of the total world benefit,
compared with 42 percent in FZa’s study.
Studies of Herbicide-tolerant Soybeans
The benefits from adopting herbicide-tolerant soybeans in 1997 were estimated by FZa
using the same methodology applied to Bt cotton (table 2).  Adopters’ and nonadopters’ mean
yields and mean weed control costs were obtained from the ARMS survey.  Because this data
source does not isolate the farm-level effects of the technology, the benefits to producers and
                                                
1 A parallel shift in the cotton supply function was assumed FZa’s study.7
consumers may be overstated.  Many of the concens associated with FZa’s analysis of Bt cotton
apply to their study of herbicide-tolerant soybeans.
MLS developed a three-region spatial equilibrium model (covering the U.S., South
America, and the ROW) for the soybean complex to evaluate the welfare effects of herbicide-
tolerant soybeans.  The spatial model seeks to solve for the market equilibrium prices and
quantities of soybeans and soybean products (soybean mean and soybean oil) under a base
scenario (assuming biotech adoption) and an alternate scenario (without biotechnology) for
1999/2000.  Differences in the prices and quantities between the two scenarios indicate the
impact of biotechnology adoption.  The model takes into account differences in supply and
demand structures for soybeans and its products, but also for the new technology embedded in
the herbicide-tolerant soybean seeds.  The model’s specification permits a non-linear supply
function and a non-parallel shift in the supply curve induced by the introduction of the
technology.
Adoption rates that were expected to represent actual plantings of herbicide-tolerant
soybeans in 1999 were employed in their study.  Like FZa, supply and demand elasticities were
taken from existing models and vary from those used in this study (table 1).  It was assumed that
adopters in 1999 realized an average saving of $20 per hectare in variable production costs.  The
results of MLS’ model are provided in table 2.
Theoretical Framework
The model used to estimate the distribution of benefits is derived from a theoretical
framework developed by ML for assessing the welfare impacts of an innovation where the
innovator behaves as a monopolist under the protection of IPR.  The change in social welfare is8
measured in both the cotton lint or soybean (output) and seed (input) markets, and encompasses
the change in Marshallian surplus and the monopoly profit captured by the innovator.
Economic surplus was measured by following several steps: (1) the technology-induced
shift in each commodity’s supply was estimated for several production regions using data on
adoption rates, crop yields, and cost savings net of increased seed costs (i.e., technology fees and
seed premiums); (2) the impacts of the new technology on world and regional prices were
calculated; (3) the distribution of Marshallian surplus in the domestic and international markets
was estimated using an approach developed by Alston, Norton, and Pardey (ANP); and (4) the
monopoly profits accrued to the technology innovators were estimated.
The empirical estimation of the stakeholders’ benefits allows research-induced Marshallian
surplus generated in an output market to be partitioned between producers and consumers.  The
ANP approach is modified to accommodate surplus gains in the input market as suggested by
ML.  In this study, ANP’s model for a large open-economy with technological spillovers was
used for Bt cotton and herbicide-tolerant soybeans.  No technological spillovers were assumed in
the case of herbicide-tolerant cotton since it was grown only in the U.S. in 1997.  Additionally,
the law of one price was assumed for the U.S. and world markets.
The economic surplus model proposed by ANP is based on the assumption that the U.S.
and the rest of the world (ROW) supply and demand functions can be modeled with the
following equations:
U.S. supply: QUS = aUS + bUS (P + kUS ) =  (aUS +bUS k US) +  bUS P,
U.S. demand: CUS = gUS - dUS P,
ROW supply: QROW = aROW + bROW (P + kROW) = (aROW +  bROW kROW) + bROWP, and
ROW demand: CROW = gROW - dROW P,9
where QUS and CUS  are the quantities produced and consumed of either cotton or soybeans in the
U.S., respectively.  Similarly, QROW is quantity of cotton or soybeans produced in the ROW, and
CROW is quantity consumed of either of those commodities in the ROW.  The terms kUS and kROW
are the vertical (price) shift in US and ROW supply curves due to the introduction of the new
technologies, respectively.  Lastly, P is the equilibrium world price of cotton or soybeans.  A
graphical representation on this model is presented in figure 1.
The first step in deriving the formulas that determine producer and consumer surpluses is to
use the identity QUS + QUS = CROW + CROW, which allows the estimation of world price P by
substitution and algebraic manipulation.  The existence of a single equilibrium price follows
from the Law of One Price assumption.  Once a new technology is introduced and adopted, only
the price that results from the supply shift can be observed, and this observed equilibrium price is
referred to as P1.  It is not possible to observe the counterfactual price, P0--the price that would
have prevailed in 1997 if all supply and demand conditions were identical and the technology
had not been introduced.  Because the surplus measures are made relative to the absence of the
innovation, P0 must be estimated.  The estimation of P0 is based on the internal consistency and
assumptions of the model.  The formula for estimating the world price is
P =  (gUS + gROW - dUS  - dROW  -  bUS kWORLD) / (bUS + gUS +  bROW + dROW ),
where kWORLD is the sum of kUS and kROW.  If there is no shift in the supply, the values of kUS ,
kROW , and thus kWORLD, equal 0 so that
P = P0 = (gUS + gROW - dUS  - dROW ) / (bUS + gUS +  bROW + dROW ).
If there is a shift in the supply curve due to the introduction of a new technology and kWORLD
equals KP0, where K= kWORLD/P0, then P = P1 = (gUS + gROW - dUS  - dROW  -  bUS K P0) / (bUS + gUS
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absolute value of the relative price change (Z) is Z= (P1- P0) / P0 = bUS KP0 / (bUS + gUS + bROW +
dROW ).  By using the trade equilibrium assumption QT0 = CROW,0 - QROW,0 = QUS,0 - CUS,0 (the
zero subscripts indicate counterfactual values), Z can be defined in elasticity form as:
Z = eUS K / [eUS + SUS hUS  + (1- SUS  ) h
EROW],
where eUS is the U.S. supply elasticity for cotton lint or soybeans, hUS is the absolute value of
U.S. demand for either commodity, h
EB is the absolute value of the net export demand elasticity,
and SUS is the share of U.S. cotton or soybean production that is consumed domestically.  The
formulas for producer and consumer surpluses in the U.S. and the ROW are:
D CSUS = P0 CUS,0 Z (1 + 0.5 Z hUS ),
D PSUS = P0 QUS,0 (KUS - Z) (1 + 0.5 ZeUS ),
D CSROW = P0 CROW,0 Z (1 + 0.5 Z hROW ),
D PSROW = -P0 QROW,0 (K ROW - Z) (1 + 0.5 ZeROW ),
D USASUS = D CSUS + D PSUS, and
D ROWSROW = D CSROW + D PSROW,
where D CSUS is the change in consumer surplus in the U.S.,  D PSUS is the change in producer
surplus in the U.S., D CSROW is change in consumer surplus in the ROW, and D PSROW is change
in producer surplus in the ROW.  The terms D USASUS and D ROWSROW represent the changes
in total surplus in the U.S. and ROW, respectively.
Counterfactual prices, quantities, and relevant elasticities may be estimated with the
following formulas, which are derived from the system equations above:
 P0 = P1 / {1 - [eUS K / [eUS + SUS hUS  + (1- SUS  ) h
EB] } and
Q0 = Q1 / {1 +  [eUS K ((SUS hUS) + (1- SUS  ) h
EB)] / [eUS + SUS hUS  + (1- SUS  ) h
EB] }.12
Data and Assumptions
Given that variations in farm-level impacts may significantly affect the distribution of
benefits, the present study utilizes several data sources to obtain a range of surplus estimates.
Information from the ARMS survey was used to determine stakeholder benefits in the cases of
Bt cotton, herbicide-tolerant cotton, and herbicide-tolerant soybeans.  This data source provided
mean adoption rates and crop yields as well as mean seed, chemical, application, scouting, and
cultivation costs for conventional and biotech varieties by ERS production region.  One
drawback of the mean ARMS data is that it incorporates other factors beyond the technology that
may affect crop yields and pest control costs.
Elasticities that isolate the impact of biotech adoption on crop yields and pesticide use
(Fernandez et al.) were used to replace the mean ARMS data, when appropriate.  For example,
using the elasticity-based estimates, Bt cotton farmers in the Southern Seaboard (roughly
equivalent to the Southeast) realized a 21 percent yield increase over producers of traditional
varieties in that region.  The mean ARMS yield increase of 11.6 percent for that region was
replaced with the 21-percent gain, and the mean ARMS yields were used for other regions since
the elasticity-based estimate applied only to the Southern Seaboard.  Moreover, all mean ARMS
data on herbicide-tolerant soybean yields were replaced with the elasticity-adjusted estimates
since they applied to all production regions.
A third source of yield and insect control cost data (Bt cotton only) was the EMD data,
which applied only to producers in the Southern Seaboard and Mississippi Portal (Delta region).
The EMD data are similar to the elasticity-based impacts in that they isolate the effect of the
technology on crop yields and pest control costs.  Because the data pertained only to producers in13
certain regions, the mean ARMS data on yields and production costs were used for all other
cotton-producing areas.
Unlike FZa, this study assumes that the ROW achieved a technology transfer efficiency
of 50 percent in the cases of Bt cotton and herbicide-tolerant soybeans.  That is, ROW producers
obtained half of the yield increases and savings in pest control costs that were realized by U.S.
farmers in 1997.  Since herbicide-tolerant cotton varieties were only available in the U.S. that
year, the rate of technology transfer to the ROW was set at zero.
Crop production data by state were obtained from USDA’s National Agricultural
Statistics Service (USDA-NASSb).  Regional adoption data as well as seed prices, premiums,
technology fees were taken from USDA’s ARMS survey.  Commodity prices were estimated by
ERS crop production region using state price data (USDA-NASSa) and weighting those values
by the share of regional production attributed to that state.  Herbicide and insecticide prices were
obtained from Gianessi and Marcelli and USDA-NASSa, with state-level data on pesticide
application rates and the percentage of area treated with various chemicals being obtained from
NASSc.
In general, the estimation of the stakeholders’ surpluses relied on FZb’s framework.
However, a number of their assumptions were changed to more accurately reflect commodity
flows and trade patterns.  Realizing that some production regions may export greater percentages
of their production than others, state-level shipment data from 1993/94 (Gale, Johnson, and
Meyer) were used to estimate export-bound movements of cotton by production region in this
study.  Commodity flow patterns were also estimated for soybeans using a 1985 grain flow
survey (Fruin, Halbach, and Hill)--the most recent information available.  Another assumption
that was modified in this study concerns the share of cotton imported by the ROW relative to its14
production.  Data on ROW production and imports were taken from USDA’s World Agricultural
Supply and Demand Estimates (USDA-OCE) to calculate the share of ROW imports relative to
ROW production.
The assumptions made in this study concerning U.S. and ROW supply and demand
elasticites differ from those in previous analyses (table 1).  In the cases of Bt cotton and
hebicide-tolerant soybeans, FZa, FTM, and MLS relied on elasticity estimates that were
previously reported in the literature.  In this analysis, regional domestic supply elasticites were
taken from a recent study by Lin et al.  The values were preferred over those employed in the
other studies because they are more up-to-date and reflect the current policy environment.  The
U.S. cotton mill demand elasticity was recently estimated by Meyer, and the net-export demand
elasticity came from a recent study by Isengildina, Hudson, and Herndon.  Like FZa, the ROW
supply and demand elasticites were taken from a study by Sullivan, Wainio, and Roningen.
In this study, key variables, including crop yields, pest control costs, and supply and
demand elasticities, were assigned probability distributions.  Crop yields were assumed to have a
normal distribution.  In any given season, some producers experience below average yields while
others achieve above-average yields.  Most producers, however, typically have yields near the
mean value.  Seed, herbicide/pesticide, scouting, application, and cultivation costs were assumed
to be log-normally distributed--a distribution that fits the mean ARMS data best.  The standard
errors for these distributions were obtained from the mean ARMS data.  The U.S. demand
elasticity for cotton was assigned a normal distribution since it was estimated with the two-stage
least squares regression technique.  The net-export demand elasticity was expected to have a
triangular distriution, with –2.28 as the most likely value.  FZb also assigned probability
distributions to key variables when estimating the distribution of benefits from the adoption of Bt15
cotton in 1996.  However, distributions that roughly fit the values in the literature were used
rather than those that are based on empirical data.
Estimation Results
In order to obtain point estimates of the benefits realized by the stakeholders, a
spreadsheet was developed to encompass the data on regional adoption rates, crop yields, seed
costs, technology fees, pest control costs, commodity prices, and the supply and demand
elasticities as well as the assumptions concerning commodity flows, export shares, and
technology transfer.  Formulas were used to calculate the estimated benefits.  Then the model
was simulated using the software package @Risk, allowing it to iterate until convergence.
Results for 1997 Bt Cotton
When the mean ARMS data were employed exclusively, the benefits from adopting Bt
cotton in 1997 totaled $140.2 million (table 3), with the U.S. capturing 83 percent of the world
benefits.  The total surplus increased with the elasticity-based estimates because of a higher yield
effect and a greater pest control cost savings in the Southeast.  The highest surplus estimate was
obtained with the EMD data, primarily due to substantial savings in pest control costs.  With the
mean ARMS data and elasticity-based estimates, the size of the total world benefit and its
division between the U.S. and the ROW are similar to that found by FZa and FTM.
The value of the benefits received by U.S. farmers in 1997 resulting from Bt cotton
adoption ranged from $31.4 million to $132.1 million (table 3).  FZa’s estimate falls in the
middle of this range, while that of FTM is significantly lower.  The disparity in this study’s
findings is due to the different assumptions concerning the extent of the technology’s impacts on16
Table 3--Surplus Estimates for Bt Cotton
Mean of ARMS Elasticity-based EMD
Stakeholder mil. $ % mil. $ % mil. $ %
U.S. Farmer Surplus 31.4 22.4 78.2 36.2 132.1 46.4
U.S. Consumer Surplus 9.9 7.1 19.9 9.2 30.9 10.8
Monsanto 62.0 44.2 62.0 28.7 62.0 21.8
Delta & Pine Land 12.9 9.2 12.9 6.0 12.9 4.5
ROW Producer Surplus -35.8 -77.8 -132.3
ROW Consumer Surplus 59.8 120.7 179.3
Net ROW 24.0 17.1 42.9 19.9 47.0 16.5
Total World Surplus 140.2 215.9 284.9
crop yields and pest control costs.  The elasticity-based estimates’ $46.8 million increase over
the results obtained with the mean ARMS data is due primarily to the significantly higher yield
impact in the Southern Seaboard.  The difference between U.S. farmers’ benefits with the mean
ARMS and EMD data was due to the latter’s significantly higher savings in pest control costs in
the Southern Seaboard and Mississippi Portal.  According to the EMD data, adopters pest control
costs were 60 percent less that those of non-adopters in the two regions.  The share of the total
benefits accrued to U.S. farmers ranged from 23 to 46 percent, with the upper bound being in
line with FZa.
The dollar value of the benefits realized by the innovators of the technology (Monsanto
and Delta & Pine Land) remains constant across the three data sources due to the fixed Bt cotton
acreage in 1997.  Monsanto’s benefit was determined primarily by the $32-per-acre technology
fee that the company charged U.S. adopters.
2  In addition to a $7.11-per-acre royalty payment
from Monsanto for the use of its parent genes (FZb), Delta & Pine Land derived a portion of its
surplus from a $2-per-acre seed premium charged to U.S. farmers.
3  The share of the benefits
realized by Monsanto was heavily dependent on the technology’s impacts on crop yields and pest
                                                
2 Monsanto also collected the same technology fee in Mexico (37,100 acres) and $74 per acre in Australia (165,000).
3 There was no seed premium was charged in other countries in 1997.17
control costs.  As the farm-level impacts increased, the majority share of the benefits shifted
from Monsanto to U.S. farmers.  The innovators’ share of the benefits achieved with the mean
ARMS data is consistent with that reported in previous studies.
Like FZa, U.S. consumers received a small portion of the total benefits--about 9 percent.
The gain realized by U.S. consumers was the result of a larger cotton supply and a lower
commodity price after the adoption of the technology (between 0.13 cents per pound and 0.53
cents per pound).   The relatively small magnitude of the U.S. consumers’ benefits is justifiable
given the fact that the pest-resistant quality of Bt cotton is an input trait.  This characteristic is
appealing to producers because it reduces crop losses and lowers pest control costs.  Beyond the
reduction in price, consumers do not experience a direct benefit from the technology (such as
health improvement).
Consumers and producers in the ROW realized a net benefit of $24.0 million to $47.1
million, depending on the data source (table 3).  ROW consumers benefited from the adoption of
Bt cotton because the increase in the cotton supply due to the new technology lowered the world
price.  Producers in other countries were hurt by the adoption of the technology.  In 1997, the
number of Bt cotton acres in the ROW was minimal.  Since the majority of cotton producers
grew traditional varieties, they did not realize the cost savings associated with Bt cotton and were
fully exposed to the reduced world price.
Results for 1997 Herbicide-Tolerant Cotton
The size and distribution of benefits associated with the adoption of herbicide-tolerant
cotton were estimated with the mean ARMS data and the elasticity-adjusted farm-level impacts.
A net loss ($41.6 million) resulted with the mean ARMS data because herbicide-tolerant cotton18
yields were generally the same or lower than those of conventional varieties.  These yields,
combined with seed premiums and per-acre technology fees, more than outweighed the savings
in weed control costs provided by the technology.  As a result, U.S. producers realized a loss.
Since the cotton supply was smaller with biotechnology, the world price increased, thus hurting
U.S. and ROW consumers, but benefiting ROW producers.
The surplus estimates determined with the elasticity-based farm-level impacts conform
more to a priori expectations than those computed with the mean ARMS data.  With this data
source, a positive surplus change ($231.6 million) was achieved, with the U.S. realizing the
majority of the benefits (table 4).  U.S. farmers gained $9.6 million from the adoption of
herbicide-tolerant cotton due mainly to a 17-percent increase in adopters’ yields.  The higher
yields, combined with savings in weed control costs, outweighed higher seed costs (including
seed premiums and technology fees).  U.S. farmers’ share of the total benefits was small--about 4
percent--because their gains were overshadowed by the increase in surplus for U.S. consumers.
U.S. consumers benefited the most from the introduction of herbicide-tolerant cotton,
gaining $132.2 million due to a lower cotton price.  The larger supply caused the world price of
cotton to fall by 2.5 cents per pound.  According to table 4, the innovators captured about 7
percent of the surplus gain.  On a net basis, the ROW gained $75.2 million, or 32 percent of the
total world surplus gain.
 Results for Herbicide-Tolerant Soybeans
The gain in total world surplus from the adoption of herbicide-tolerant soybeans in 1997
ranged from $307.5 million to more than $1 billion (table 5).  The upper range of the benefit19
Table 4.  Surplus Estimates for Herbicide-Tolerant Cotton
ARMS Elasticity-based
Stakeholder mil.$ mil.$ %
U.S. Farmer Surplus -6.5 9.6 4.1
U.S. Consumer Surplus -31.4 132.2 57.1
Monsanto 10.7 10.7 4.6
Delta & Pine Land 3.9 3.9 1.7
ROW Producer Surplus 177.5 -733.3
ROW Consumer Surplus -195.8 808.5
Net ROW -18.3 75.2 32.5
Total World Surplus -41.6 231.6
Table 5.  Surplus Estimates for Herbicide-Tolerant Soybeans
ARMS Elasticity-based
Stakeholder mil. $ % mil. $ %
U.S. Farmer Surplus 455.7 44.2 61.9 20.1
U.S. Consumer Surplus 134.3 13.0 15.9 5.2
Monsanto 85.6 8.3 85.6 27.8
Seed Companies 124 12.0 124.6 40.5
ROW Producer Surplus -224.1 -34.2
ROW Consumer Surplus 455.6 53.7
Net ROW 231.5 22.5 19.5 6.3
Total World Surplus 1031.1 307.5
estimates is comparable with the findings of FZa and MLS.  With the EMD data, the U.S.
captured the lion’s share of benefits at 94 percent.
When the impacts on yields and weed control costs from the mean ARMS data were
employed, U.S. farmers were estimated to have received $455.7 million.  However, with the
elasticity-based impacts, farmers gained only $61.9 million.  The large discrepancy in the benefit
estimates was due to the mean ARMS data’s significantly higher yields and pest control cost
savings in a number of important soybean-producing regions.  For example, the ARMS survey
revealed that adopters of herbicide-tolerant soybeans in the Heartland region -- where 64 percent20
of U.S. soybeans were grown -- realized yields that were 14.2 higher and weed control costs that
were 31 percent lower than those of non-adopters in 1997.  The benefits for U.S. farmers
obtained with the elasticity-based estimates are more justifiable because the yield impact is more
in line with analysts’ belief that the yield differences in 1997 were minimal, if not negative
(Carpenter and Gianessi).  While the value of U.S. farmers’ benefit is in line with that by FZa,
the share of the total surplus gain matches MLS’ results.
The estimated benefit received by Monsanto (the developer of the technology),
was the result of a $7.25-per-acre technology fee that was charged to adopters.
4  The total benefit
received by seed companies was derived from seed premiums that ranged from $1.58 to $8.47
per acre.
5  The benefits captured by Monsanto and the seed companies do not take into account
payments that licensing companies paid Monsanto for the use of the technology.  When the
herbicide-resistant trait was first developed for soybeans, Monsanto allowed some seed
companies to purchase the technology outright for one lump sum of money.  Other firms were
required to pay annual licensing fees.  Because the “use-of-technology” payment varied from
firm to firm, it was not included in the calculation of the innovators’ benefits.
The shares of the total benefits held by the innovators (Monsanto and the seed
companies) in 1997 were relatively small when the ARMS farm-level impacts were used.  These
percentages rose considerably when the elasticity-based estimates of the farm-level impacts were
used.  The companies’ portion of the benefits soared because U.S. farmers’ surplus declined as a
result of smaller yield impacts and weed control cost savings, thus allowing the firms’ fixed
                                                
4 In 1997, the technology fee was $5 per 50-pound bag of herbicide-tolerant soybean seed.  A 1.45 bag per acre
seeding rate was assumed when calculating the technology fee.
5 The difference between the two surplus gains (table 5) occurs because the seed premiums were estimated by
subtracting the traditional soybean price and the technology fee from the total herbicide-tolerant seed price.  Because
the traditional and herbicide-tolerant seed prices were assigned probability distributions, @Risk did not select the
same seed prices in the two simulations, thus causing the seed companies’ surplus to differ between the two data
sources.21
surpluses to represent larger proportions of the total worldwide gain.  Like MLS, the innovators
of the technology captured a large share of the total benefits (elasticity-based estimates).
U.S. consumers benefited from the technology since the increase in the soybean supply
lowered the commodity’s price by 1.2 cents per bushel to 9.5 cents per bushel (table 5).  The
gains realized by domestic consumers using the two data sources are comparatively smaller than
those obtained by the innovators and U.S. farmers (about 5 to 13 percent of the total benefits).
Many analyses (including FZa and MLS) find that the U.S. consumers’ portion of the benefits is
small since the herbicide-tolerant trait is designed for farmers rather than consumers, allowing
farmers to more effectively control weeds.
The ROW also gained from the adoption of herbicide-tolerant soybeans.  While the net
change in surplus was positive, foreign producers realized a loss due to the planting of herbicide-
tolerant soybeans worldwide.  Except in Argentina, the adoption of herbicide-tolerant varieties
outside of the U.S. was minimal in 1997.
6  As a result, most foreign producers faced a lower
world price without having the yield gains and reductions in weed control costs.  ROW
consumers, on the other hand, profited from lower soybean prices.  On a net basis, the ROW
earned $19.5 million with the elasticity-based farm-level impacts (6 percent of the total world
benefits) and $231.5 million with the mean ARMS data (22 percent of the total surplus).
Conclusion
The size and distribution of the benefits arising from the adoption of biotech crops vary
significantly, depending on the farm-level effects and the supply and demand elasticity
assumptions for the domestic and world markets.  Estimates of the benefits derived from the
                                                
6 Approximately 3.5 million acres and 2,500 acres herbicide-tolerant soybeans of were planted in Argentina and
Canada in 1997, respectively, while 11.8 million acres were planted in the U.S. (James).22
elasticity-based approach and the EMD data appear to be more plausible than those obtained
from the ARMS survey because the farm-level impacts obtained from the first two sources are
attributed more to biotechnology.
This study does not lend support to the popular belief that U.S. farmers received at least
one-half, or as much as over two-thirds, of the total benefits realized from the adoption of
biotechnology (McHughen, Paarlberg).  Rather, results of this study indicate that in 1997, U.S.
farmers realized considerably less than half of the total benefits.  The bulk of the benefits appear
to have gone to the gene supplier, seed companies, U.S. consumers, and the rest of the world.
Estimates of the benefits for producers and consumers in the domestic and international
markets in this study could potentially be biased upward because a parallel shift in the supply
function is assumed in estimating Marshallian surplus.  To the extent that the shift is nonlinear,
the area of the surplus measure is overstated in this study as market prices move away from the
equilibrium level.   However, the bias does not appear to be significant for most stakeholders
(other than the rest of the world) in the case of herbicide-tolerant soybeans in 1997.23
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